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U.S. POLICY ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
Loretta Bondì

T

his article reviews the development of U.S. policy on controlling the proliferation of small arms before, during, and after the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects. It chronicles the policy’s evolution from the formulations of the William
J. Clinton administration to those of its successor. It argues that despite this
changing of the guard, the main tenets of the policy have remained largely unchanged, and that the United States has failed to take leadership on this issue,
adopting instead a minimalist approach—and correspondingly small expenditures. This policy choice has disappointed allies and partners, as well as large sectors of the nongovernmental community, affecting their views and weakening
their confidence that major weapons producers will invest what is necessary to
control the spread and misuse of small arms in areas of conflict, where it matters
most. In this regard, the article points out aspects of U.S. law and practice that
could have offered rallying points and models but were instead obfuscated by
U.S. pugnacious rhetoric. This discussion also assesses how the aftermath of the
11 September 2001 attacks largely stalled, rather than stimulated, global progress and suggests that the connection between small arms proliferation and
transnational threats, such as terrorism, has not been
Loretta Bondì, an independent scholar, was the director
of the Cooperative Security Program at the Johns
properly addressed. The article then turns to areas in
Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
which active U.S. involvement has, in contrast, proved
International Studies and a cofounder of the Internafertile and yielded concrete results, including propostional Action Network on Small Arms. This article was
commissioned by the Council on Foreign Relations Afals aimed at fostering effective and enduring
rica Program.
change—measures that, if properly developed and expanded, may offer a viable blueprint for a 2006 UN
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Review Conference on this issue. The article goes on to weigh the role and resonance of American domestic policies on gun control and to examine how the
new national security doctrine is affecting, and will likely affect, the international debate on small arms. Finally, it looks at how the influence of American
interest groups and policy circles has shaped and may continue to underpin U.S.
perspective and interaction at the multilateral and bilateral levels.
ATTITUDES AND MAGNITUDES
At around midnight on 20 July 2001, the president of the UN Conference on the
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects “stopped the
clock.”1 This action allowed the mammoth, ten-day-long negotiations a chance
to hammer out the many controversial issues that, on the very last day of the first
global consultation on small arms, were still unresolved.
The UN Conference
At stake were measures to curb the spread and misuse of small arms and light
weapons, identified by the United Nations as the weapons of choice in
forty-seven out of forty-nine conflicts that had erupted during the preceding de2
cade. The massive human toll in lives and livelihoods exacted by assault-rifletoting military forces, militia, and gangs needed a commensurate and global
response. As the UN noted, “small arms are responsible for over half a million
deaths per year, including three hundred thousand in armed conflict and two
3
hundred thousand more from homicides and suicides.” However, the document the conference finally delivered—Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its As4
pects—was heavy on rhetoric and light on actual commitment.
The primary merits of the conference’s outcome resided in the fact that it put
the dangers posed by the proliferation and abuse of small arms on governmental
radar screens and created a consultative framework for the next five years. Indeed, its most important legacy is that for the first time it framed this issue,
which had been long neglected as a minor disarmament topic, in terms beyond
those of arsenal reduction and destruction. The conference had sidestepped human rights and international humanitarian law considerations, but the debate
would now embrace a wide spectrum of concerns, from intrastate conflict to
sexual violence and the devastation of communities.
The multilayered aspects of small arms proliferation and their implications
for national and international policy had induced countries to negotiate the
Programme of Action—a political document—with a fervor, attention to semantics, and rigidity of parameters usually reserved for treaties and legally binding
agreements. As a case in point, the American delegation drew up and fiercely

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/7

2

Bondì: U.S. Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons
BONDÌ

121

defended a set of “red lines,” thresholds that Washington would not allow the
conference to trespass and that remain central to U.S. policy on small arms today. The final document and subsequent initiatives, the United States insisted,
were not to include:

• Any definition encompassing any non-military-style weapons or lethal
weapons of war

• Any restriction on civilian possession of arms
• Any clause banning transfers to nonstate actors
• Any calls for negotiations on legally binding international instruments.5
The then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (and now U.S. Representative to the United Nations) John Bolton
also took issue with the involvement of large sectors of international civil society. “We do not support the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or nongovernmental organizations, particularly when those
political or policy views advocated are not consistent with the views of all member states,” Bolton asserted. “What individual governments do in this regard is
for them to decide, but we do not regard the international governmental support
6
of political viewpoints to be consistent with democratic principles.” These
words might have soothed American pro-gun lobbyists, who in fact exulted, but activists of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)—a coalition of
hundreds of human rights, humanitarian, democracy, community, church-based,
7
and arms control organizations—found them unduly peremptory.
Many countries resented the notion that the narrow interests of U.S. pro-gun
8
groups should prevail at an international forum and supersede global concerns.
A result was widespread scrutiny of the American posture on small arms and
comparison with other expressions of U.S. “unilateralism,” as reflected in Washington’s stands on the land mines treaty, the International Criminal Court, and
the Kyoto Protocol.
Setting the Stage
If the stark articulation of the American small arms policy made jaws drop at the
conference, the approach itself should not have come as a surprise. Save for some
notable differences in levels of engagement, style of presentation, and choice of
interlocutors, U.S. policy on small arms has been remarkably consistent since its
original formulation in the mid-to-late 1990s.
That period witnessed the convulsions of the African Great Lakes region,
triggered by the Rwandan genocide, and the exacerbation of violent strife elsewhere in Africa (as well as in Latin America and Asia) over control of natural re9
sources, drugs, and contraband. Virtually all these conflicts were fought mainly
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with small arms and light weapons, and they illustrated the extent to which per10
petrators, enablers, and targets had become “privatized.” Ruthless nonstate actors were increasingly joining the ranks of belligerents and acquiring weapons
from government-held arsenals; fresh arms supplies were also procured in the illegal market.
Further, in the 1990s the downsizing of the military forces of former Warsaw
Pact countries released a cascade of excess weapons to warring parties in Africa
and elsewhere. In their quest for
hard currency and market niches,
In these arenas U.S. law has much to teach,
ex–Eastern bloc governments and
and it would seem to be in the interest of the
United States that others follow the same path. private sellers were less than fastidious about the human-rights
credentials of buyers. For their part, buyers accepted weaponry that, while hardly
11
state of the art, was efficient, cheap, and abundant.
In such ways, commercial considerations consistently took precedence over
the need to discipline a trade that, by its international nature, increasingly
chipped away at the ability of governments to control exports of military equipment and technology, verify the bona fides of recipients, or identify end users.
On this fertile ground private traffickers mushroomed, trading in arms, endangered animal species and products, gemstones, minerals, and other valuable
12
commodities. Such operators often acted on their own, but they also offered
their services to governments and official agents.
Tragically, the victims of those conflicts fueled by such arms transfers were
also increasingly nonstate actors, usually the most vulnerable elements in a society. These included civilians, who were deliberately targeted, and child soldiers,
who became a feature of violent confrontations and massive human-rights
13
abuses. The ubiquity and lethality of small arms and light weapons in the battlefield, in villages, and on streets from Johannesburg to Mexico City also highlighted the contiguity of the legal trade with the illegal market, as well as the
inability or unwillingness of governments to establish or enforce controls to
14
stem the flows.
As the world’s largest holder of small arms stockpiles and their largest exporter and importer, the United States bore, and bears today, a major responsi15
bility for controlling the possession and transfer of these weapons. The Small
Arms Survey, a nongovernmental think tank, calculated that as of 2003, with
more than 270 million civilian and police firearms and similar military holdings, the United States was the most armed country in the world. It now accounts for almost half of all known firearms in the world, with annual imports
16
of a million firearms and domestic production of four million units. As of
17
2001, the survey noted, authorized U.S. exports were valued at $741.4 million.
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Domestically, during the 1990s Washington faced mounting concern about
the misuse of firearms. The 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act re18
quired licensed firearms dealers to conduct background checks on purchasers.
Further progress was achieved a year later with the ban of so-called assault
weapons, prohibiting domestic sale and holding of nineteen types of semiautomatic assault weapons. (That ban expired in September 2004, on which more
19
below.)
Internationally, President Clinton voiced a heightened awareness of the problem of small arms proliferation before the fiftieth UN General Assembly in October 1995, presciently illustrating a link between, on one hand, the “gray
market” that fueled terrorism and criminality and, on the other, the availability
of firearms.20 In 1996, on the basis of this realization and in response to congressional and public pressure, the United States pioneered a statute on arms
brokering that brought a significant but previously unregulated portion of the
21
arms market under control (discussed below). During the same year, in a move
to expand transparency and accountability, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require a detailed annual report on commercial arms exports below the previous reporting threshold for arms transfers, which
22
traditionally had captured only major weapons sales. On the multilateral stage,
the Clinton administration signed the seminal 1997 Convention against the
Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and
Related Materials. Mexico had spearheaded this Organization of American
States (OAS) agreement, designed to control the illicit flow of arms from the
23
United States across the border. This convention, in turn, offered the basis
upon which to negotiate a global firearms agreement; it later became a protocol
24
to the 2000 Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. (To date, the
United States has ratified neither of these conventions.)
As this movement toward international action gathered traction in 1996–99,
the U.S. government began to formulate for itself a comprehensive approach to
small arms. The policy that emerged included a set of priorities and “no-go areas” that, by and large, stand today. Presenting a “U.S. Initiative on Small Arms”
before a UN Security Council ministerial meeting on 24 September 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright gave priority to such actions as:

• Adopting a voluntary moratorium on arms sales to regions of conflict not
already covered by arms embargoes, particularly in Africa

• Committing the United States to work with other states to crack down on
illegal brokering activities

• Mobilizing allies and partners to develop principles of restraint and a joint
action plan on small arms transfers
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• Devoting resources, training, and expertise to the destruction of weapons
stocks worldwide.

25

In parallel, red lines were defined along the parameters previously mentioned, in order both to accommodate domestic constituencies, such as the arms
industry and the pro-gun lobby—known as the “equities”—and to respond to
pressure for action by arms control and human-rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a group of which in 1998 contributed to creating and subse26
quently launching IANSA. Some of these red lines were refined over time.
Accordingly, U.S. reluctance to negotiate any additional treaty to control small
arms grew apace not only with failure to ratify existing international pacts but
also with progressive NGO research and focus on the areas that lend themselves
to such legally binding agreements—brokering, marking and tracing weapons,
and arms-export criteria respectful of human rights and international humanitarian law.27 These were areas that neither the OAS convention nor the firearms
protocol covered in sufficient detail and in which national legislation was direly
28
lacking or unenforceable.
A similar inadequacy emerged when the havoc wrought by brutal nonstate
actors in Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere made it apparent that after-the-fact international arms embargoes and
other sanctions, as well as voluntary moratoria on exports, had failed either to
deny these forces the tools of abuse or to restrain their actions. Consequently, activists in civil society and governments like that of Canada started to advocate
preventive measures, in the form of a blanket ban on the supply of assault weap29
ons to nonstate actors. The United States would have none of this, fearing, as
Bolton explained, that “oppressed” freedom fighters would not be able to defend
30
themselves against genocidal aggressors. An additional aspect of this proposal
that alarmed U.S. interest groups and officials alike was the possibility that such
a nonstate-actor ban might become a Trojan horse, ultimately impairing possession of weapons by civilians—who are, by definition, nonstate actors.
A New Course?
The policy was altered only at the margins by the first George W. Bush administration as it sought its own bearings on an issue for which the newcomers felt no
31
particular affinity. A perceptible, if not substantive, shift did occur, however.
The immediate casualties of the changing of the guard were the sense of urgency and whirlwind activism the outgoing administration had displayed. According to a Department of State official, the senior Clinton bureaucrats who
had shaped its small arms policy had felt a deep sense of commitment and had
been commensurately engaged. “The policy was personality-driven and
hands-on, but [that quality] did not effectively percolate to the lower ranks of
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32

the bureaucracy,” this official observed. Clinton’s secretary of state herself had
33
addressed the issue in two pace-setting and passionate speeches. Her successor
did not seem inclined to tackle the issue head-on, however. Expectations that
Colin Powell would bring insights from his military past to bear on this subject
were disappointed. Powell did mention the problem of small arms proliferation
during a meeting with President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda in 2001, but their
34
discussion barely touched upon it. Subsequent pronouncements on this issue
(discussed below) lacked both vision and innovation. As a result, just before and
after the 2001 UN conference the U.S. policy on small arms followed a path of
least resistance, when it did not seem to be utterly adrift.
Gone was the interagency process that had bolstered coherence and leadership. Instead, policy articulation and evolution was caught up for a while in a
tug-of-war between the State and Defense departments, both claiming leader35
ship on the issue. In 2003 the State Department gained the upper hand, when
then assistant secretary of state Lincoln P. Bloomfield took charge of the small
arms portfolio and launched the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement
(OWRA). Even a cursory look at the OWRA website reveals scant information
36
on small arms and a disproportionate focus on land mines. Officials claim that
this imbalance is due merely to the relative newness of the former concern and
37
fierce competition for scarce resources within the bureaucracy. Nonetheless,
such a paucity of information is not only regrettable but indicates that the issue
of small arms has been given a low priority.
Gone were also regular consultations with the U.S.-based NGOs of the Small
Arms Working Group (SAWG), most of which were affiliated with IANSA. In
contrast, the pro-gun lobby, which boasted of having an office in the Oval Office,
took solace in the Bush adminis38
The U.S. arms export system is one of the most tration’s ascent to power. Civil
servants who had been active on
sophisticated and transparent in the world.
the issue in both administrations
remained available for information sharing and comment when approached by
SAWG members. But these ad hoc contacts represented an inadequate substitute
for the process that had previously underpinned government and NGO
interaction.
Moreover, the consultative process with other governments was hampered by
the general depreciation that the Bush team had repeatedly voiced concerning
multilateral initiatives, particularly those that centered upon or were led by the
United Nations. If President Bush in his national security strategy pledged to
work with allies and partners and called upon their active engagement, his doctrine of the right of the United States to act preemptively in an open-ended war
against the ill-defined threat of “terror” left such partners in no doubt that
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39

Washington would regard cooperation as optional and nonbinding. The acrimonious debate over Iraq at the UN Security Council was perceived as a further
indication that the United States would invoke and pursue its security interests
40
even at the cost of a deep rift with its historical allies.
THE MISSING LINK: SMALL ARMS AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS
The areas that suffered from, and continue to be affected by, the Bush administration’s outlook concerning small arms were those in which progress—through
cooperative security action—was most badly needed, namely, preventing weapons from reaching unstable areas and tackling the connection between the licit
and illicit trade in small arms and transnational threats, such as terrorism.
The failure to draw such linkage in the September 2002 National Security
Strategy of the United States of America was particularly regrettable and may be
undermining the ability of partners and allies to respond to global challenges
jointly. Two of the main thrusts of the strategy were raising awareness of the unfathomable dangers posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
particularly in failing states, and rallying support for counteraction. However, in
the African, Latin American, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern contexts, the
real weapons of choice are assault rifles and explosives, while potential participants in “coalitions of the willing” continue to be challenged by armed opponents and to undermine their own governmental legitimacy by egregious
state-enforced human-rights abuses. 41 Thus, an opportunity to define an enduring problem and its emerging implications for counterterrorism was lost.
Although the linkage was made in later administration pronouncements,
there is no indication that the main rationale of the American approach has
42
been substantially revised. John Bolton had spelled out that rationale: “We do
not support measures that would constrain legal trade and legal manufacturing
of small arms and light weapons. The vast majority of arms transfers in the
43
world are routine and not problematic.” Yet past U.S. interventions and a series
of studies had demonstrated that weapons were routinely diverted by intended
end users for unsavory purposes and that governments continued to contravene
their own stated policies and international commitments by transferring weapons irresponsibly.
For example, in 1996 the U.S. government instituted a ban on firearms exports for commercial purposes to Paraguay and subjected sales to that nation’s
government and police to heightened scrutiny, because Paraguayan diversion of
arms and ammunition to other countries in Latin America had reportedly be44
come a major regional concern. Two years later, in an unprecedented move,
Washington publicly reprimanded Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia,
and Ukraine for selling arms to warring Ethiopia and Eritrea. It was not clear
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whether these transfers included just small arms or major weapons systems as
well. In either case, they had occurred despite calls for restraint by the United
Nations and the Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls over Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods (an institution comprising thirty-three major
45
weapons-producing states). The ability of the United States either to prevent
or stop such diversions remains severely constrained, while its own record in
46
monitoring end-user behavior is lackluster at best.
Moreover, private commercial sales in the United States have proven to be a
47
source for the illegal market. The extent of the risk involved in the ready availability of guns became all too apparent when the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) reported in January 2005 that “a total of 44 firearm-related background checks handled by the FBI . . . resulted in valid matches with terrorist
watch list records. Of this total, 35 transactions were allowed to proceed because
the background checks found no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions, illegal immigrant status, or other disqualifying factors.”48 However,
these evident perils do not appear to have given pause to the pro-gun lobby and
its supporters, like the National Rifle Association. In March 2005, the New York
Times observed that “the NRA and gun rights supporters in Congress have
fought—successfully, for the most part—to limit the use of the FBI’s national
gun-purchasing database in West Virginia as a tool for law enforcement investigators, saying the database would amount to an illegal registry of gun owners nation49
wide.” To make matters worse, it is estimated that theft from legitimate owners
50
alone injects up to half a million firearms into the black market each year.
AREAS OF PROGRESS
American leadership or active participation has been limited to areas where the
United States either has a pressing national interest in achieving progress or already has in place, or is in the process of developing, comprehensive measures.
As a result, Washington’s approach has been cautious and incremental. It is
marked by neither vision, great burden, nor leadership.
Controlling MANPADS and Destroying Weapons
In the context of the antiterrorism fight, one category of light weapons has received particular attention from the United States—MANPADS, or man-portable
air-defense systems. Such a weapon was used in 1994 to down the airplane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana, an attack that triggered the Rwandan genocide. MANPADS were also used by terrorists in a failed 2002 attack against a
charter plane in Mombasa; a weapon from the same stock had previously been
retrieved near the Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia. The Congressional Research Service reports that “since 1973, nearly half of all air losses in combat
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have been attributed to IR [infrared]-guided SAMs [surface-to-air missiles]
51
many of them launched from MANPADS.” GAO estimates that since the 1950s,
twenty countries have produced and developed at least thirty different types of
52
MANPADS. Unlike other categories of light weapons, MANPADS are produced only by countries with sophisticated defense industrial complexes, but
53
they are stockpiled by 105 countries, according the Small Arms Survey. These
numbers are likely to grow, as developing states seek to acquire these weapons as
a cheap alternative to larger antiaircraft systems. It is not by coincidence, the survey notes, that MANPADS are appearing “in regions where conflict is widespread” and that at least thirteen nonstate groups, some of which are considered
terrorist organizations, may already possess them.54 Although the United States
believes that the vast majority of the more than one million MANPADS manufactured in the world are in national inventories or have been safely destroyed, it
acknowledges that many systems are yet to be accounted for and may be outside
55
of government control.
The United States has long sought to mop up these weapons in Afghanistan,
from where, of the thousand Stingers transferred in the 1980s in support of the
anti-Soviet war, only between two and six hundred have reportedly been re56
turned to the United States. After the Taliban regime collapsed, the United
States managed to retrieve a number of them, and in Iraq it has reportedly of57
fered five hundred dollars in payment for each system surrendered. As of February 2005, the United States had destroyed 10,500 MANPADS in twelve
58
countries.
Responding to the threat posed by MANPADS to civil aviation, the U.S. government has asked the private sector to study the feasibility of adapting available
59
military defense technology to civilian planes. The RAND Corporation, however, concludes that it is not cost-effective to spend billions of dollars equipping
America’s 6,800 commercial airliners against attack from shoulder-fired missiles. RAND argues that the investment might be justifiable later if antimissile
60
systems become more economical and reliable.
Multilaterally, the United States has worked with allies and partners of the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Group of
Eight,* the Wassenaar Arrangements, and the twenty-one APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation) states to implement an action plan aimed at preventing
61
terrorists from acquiring these weapons. It has spearheaded a NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund to help Ukraine destroy excess munitions, small arms,
and light weapons, including MANPADS.62 However, as GAO notes, “multilateral forum members’ compliance with their commitments is voluntary, and the
* Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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forums lack mechanisms to verify that members implement their political com63
mitments or to analyze participants’ reported data on arms transfers.” A February 2005 bilateral agreement signed with Russia to foster cooperation in the
64
control of MANPADS may present similar challenges.
American initiatives on MANPADS dovetail with two long-standing American priorities for controlling the spread of small arms: destruction of excess or
illicit stocks to hamper weapons recirculation and stockpile management to prevent leakage from arsenals. Since 2001, the United States has spent eleven million dollars to destroy 841,277 weapons (including MANPADS) and more than
seventy-five million rounds of ammunition in at least thirteen countries, in65
cluding Angola, Guinea, Liberia, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Senegal. Moreover, the budget for surplus weapons destruction has increased to seven million
66
dollars for 2005 from three million allocated in the previous fiscal year. To facilitate progress, the United States—in concert with Canada and the Netherlands—has also drafted an OSCE best-practice guide for destruction of
weapons. Washington has extended similar assistance to discourage theft and
leakage and to account for and secure weapons in government stockpiles of such
67
countries as Ecuador and El Salvador, as well as former Warsaw Pact members.
Enhancing Transparency
The U.S. arms export system is one of the most sophisticated and transparent in
the world. Since the 2001 UN Conference, the United States has implemented or
taken the lead on three important initiatives that may enhance accountability,
information sharing, and confidence building in small arms and light weapons
transfers.
The first involved provisions related to small arms and light weapons in the
2002 Security Assistance Act, which was promoted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
68
and advocated by SAWG members. Sections 206 and 241 lower the reporting
requirements on exported small arms and light weapons from fourteen million
dollars to one million. This innovation is of particular importance, because
most small arms exports fall below the former threshold. The act also mandates,
among other provisions, annual reporting of the activities of registered arms
brokers, implementation of end-user monitoring, and investigations by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), in order that the United States
not be a source of hardware for criminal and terrorist activities. These unprecedented measures may serve as a model for other countries, and they allow a considerable degree of public scrutiny.
Internationally, the United States has been instrumental in including certain
categories of light weapons in the UN registry of arms transfers, which pre69
viously covered only seven major weapons types. The registry is compiled
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exclusively, however, from voluntary inputs; willful holdouts need not provide
detailed information, or any at all. Nor is it clear what leverage Washington
could have to encourage recalcitrant governments to report fully to the registry.
Nonetheless, this initiative—long advocated by arms-control NGOs—has the
potential to enhance state cooperation, as well as accountability, through peer
pressure.
Moreover, in December 2002 the United States led other members of the
Wassenaar Arrangement to agree on nonbinding guidelines concerning exports
of small arms and light weapons, including MANPADS. These voluntary guidelines list the criteria for states to use in assessing transfers; they detail grounds
upon which transactions ought to be refused, including considerations of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international humanitarian law.70
Reining in Arms Brokers and Tracking Weapons
The United States has also achieved progress in an area where its legislation had
pioneered international efforts and stimulated attention—the control of brokers, transportation agents, and financiers involved in arms transactions. These
middlemen are largely unregulated, and they have taken advantage of this lack
of control to conduct transactions with a variety of unsavory clients in Africa
71
and elsewhere, often in violation of arms embargoes.
In 1996, the United States enacted a comprehensive brokering statute as an
72
amendment to the 1976 Arms Export Control Act. This amendment was an effort to address critical aspects of the arms brokering problem and end the impunity with which illegal traffickers were operating. The new statute requires
American brokers living anywhere and foreign nationals residing in the United
States to register and obtain licenses for all arms deals they transact. The law not
only empowers U.S. agencies to keep tabs on the number of brokers and their
operations but subjects violators to American jurisdiction wherever an offense
has been committed.
To date, however, only twenty-five states have enacted similar laws regulating
arms middlemen, and these controls vary widely in the range of activities covered. This enfeebles the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. statute, since absence of,
or variations in, definitions and statutory scope in other countries can hamper
investigations and extradition of offenders. However, Washington has consistently resisted efforts to realize the full potential of its own law, failing in particular to support an international treaty that would offer uniform and enforceable
73
standards. Due in part to American opposition, the UN Programme of Action
is notably weak on this crucial issue.
The United States instead has chosen to take an incremental and regionoriented approach—for example, by promoting, in concert with Canada, model
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regulations at the Organization of American States. Other regional organizations and groupings have followed a similar path. U.S. engagement in this effort
is crucial, but so limited a framework is rife with pitfalls. Regional arrangements
do not cover enough territory to counter a phenomenon that knows no national
or regional boundaries. Moreover, enforcement that is not shored up by the
force of law or by formal mechanisms for verification faces a variety of hurdles.
Absent a mutually agreed legal basis, judicial cooperation in conducting investigations overseas, obtaining extradition of suspects, and initiating prosecutions
74
are problematic. Further, the American approach on brokering risks diluting
international focus by creating an illusion of action and follow-through where
in reality there is none.
Finally, in an attempt to tackle the connection between licit and illicit transfers, the United States has actively participated in a UN Open Ended Working
Group, designed to create consensus on an international instrument in time for
a UN Conference review scheduled for 2006, to mark and trace small arms and
light weapons. The consensus
U.S. policy on small arms has been remarkably document that emerged from
consistent since its original formulation in the these consultations is expected to
be adopted by the UN General Asmid-to-late 1990s.
sembly in late 2005. This too is an
area where the United States excels. All American-licensed manufacturers and
75
importers are required to mark weapons. Since the UN Conference, the U.S.
agency for the control of alcohol, tobacco, and firearms (ATF) has established
specific height and depth marking requirements for licensees to import and
manufacture firearms. In addition, commercial manufacturers are required to
maintain permanent records on their production or acquisition of firearms; and
records of licensed importers and exporters of defense articles must remain
76
available for six and five years, respectively. However, as an observer pointed
out, the substance of this agreement is disappointing in several respects. For example, the document is “politically rather than legally binding; it does not include ammunition within its scope; and the mechanisms for promoting
77
implementation and further development of the instrument are weak.” Regrettably, the United States has resisted a legally binding and more comprehensive
78
outcome.
THE WAY FORWARD
By its very nature, small arms trafficking is a phenomenon that involves more
than one state; in fact, it has global repercussions. Consequently, a multilateral
approach—comparing experiences, strengthening government responses where
they are weak, and bolstering controls where they are inadequate—is eminently
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suited to addressing small arms proliferation and its consequences. Thus far,
however, states, including such major weapons producers as the United States,
China, and Russia, have chosen a minimalist and largely rhetorical approach to
the problem, steering clear of legally binding commitments that would bolster
international responses, the legitimacy of state action, and the sustainability of
governmental and nongovernmental effort.
Moreover, the United States has reportedly contributed to the weakening or
scrapping altogether of important language on small arms and light weapons in
the outcome document presented at the September 2005 world summit of leaders.79 IANSA registered its disappointment by noting that an earlier draft of the
document “represented some progress towards an international Arms Trade
Treaty and a legally binding agreement controlling arms brokers. The U.S. proposed
huge cuts in the draft agreement on many issues, and in the following frantic negoti80
ations the opportunity to make progress on reducing gun violence was lost.”
The UN Review Conference in 2006 will offer participants an opportunity to
overcome differences and devise action, particularly regarding brokering, marking and tracing, and criteria for arms exports. The pressing matters lend themselves to international codification that, in turn, may stimulate and channel
cooperation as well as promote enforcement effectiveness.
Because it is the world’s largest exporter of small arms and light weapons,
what the United States does domestically in this area influences, informs, and often guides international action. In contrast, U.S. neglect discourages and possibly undermines multilateral initiatives. Congressional failure to renew the
assault-weapons ban in 2004 did nothing to reassure allies and partners that the
United States has a genuine commitment to putting its own house in order. Such
weapons, when misused, are no less lethal on the domestic scene than they are
elsewhere. Moreover, absent stringent restrictions, they spill over national borders. Yet Congress chose to allow the ban to expire, and the White House, not
81
following up its initial signals in favor of the ban, remained silent. This occurred despite the fact that, according to a survey conducted by the Consumer
Federation of America and the Educational Fund, a majority of gun owners in
all but two states, as well as a majority of current and former military personnel
82
and law enforcement officials, supported a renewal of the ban.
Failure to extend the assault-weapons ban was undoubtedly interpreted outside the United States as yet another example of self-invoked exceptionalism, by
which Washington exempts itself from rules that it would like to see applied elsewhere. The U.S. emphasis on weapons destruction, the centerpiece of American
international small arms policy, is predicated on the notion that the risk of the
misuse of weapons is directly proportional to the ease of their availability. The
expiration of the ban undermined that notion and its self-evident rationale.
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To many observers and many of its partners, U.S. resistance to codifying in
international treaties the best and most innovative aspects of its own law is
equally puzzling. IANSA and the communities it represents around the world
advocate immediate action on three specific fronts of the struggle against small
arms proliferation: establishment of arms export criteria based on human rights
and international humanitarian law; more stringent controls on arms
brokering; and a universal regime to track weapons. In all three arenas U.S. law
has much to teach, and it
would seem to be in the interThe massive human toll in lives and livelihoods
est of the United States that
exacted by assault-rifle-toting military forces,
others follow the same path.
militia, and gangs needed a commensurate and
Global application of Ameriglobal response.
can laws and norms in this area
would not only strengthen the
nation’s enforcement capacity but minimize the adjustments required to existing U.S. statutes. On arms exports criteria, for example, the Arms Export Control Act and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, and section 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 contain
the kind of provisions for human rights, peace, and security that NGOs would
83
like to see in an international arms exports treaty. These principles were reiterated in the 1999 International Arms Sales Code of Conduct Act, which was part
of the 2000 State Department Authorization Act, requiring the president to sup84
port negotiations of a multilateral regime on arms transfer criteria.
By the same token, the U.S. statute on arms brokering and practice in weapons tracking should also be incorporated in legally binding international commitments. Granted, and as noted above, regional organizations have already
taken steps in this direction, in Africa, the European Union, and the Organization of American States. In 2001, countries of the Southern Africa Development
Community signed a legally binding protocol with strong and expansive con85
trols on arms brokering. Similarly, in April 2004 countries in the Great Lakes
region and the Horn of Africa agreed on a protocol encompassing wide-ranging
measures to prevent, deter, and reduce illicit arms trafficking, including require86
ments for the transaction and mediation of arms deals. At other latitudes, the
87
European Union has passed a “common position” concerning arms brokering.
However, if regional solutions are reasonable first steps, they need to be expanded globally. History has shown that illegal operations are easily relocatable
to places where controls are lax, and regions are just as porous as the nations that
regional barriers were conceived to protect. Wider international cooperation
and coordination, then, enhances both domestic and interstate efforts. Moreover, a binding international legal framework would not prevent stricter
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domestic or regional standards, should states or regional groupings wish to en88
act them.
The reluctance of the U.S. administration to pursue such treaties stems in
part from fear that failure of the Senate to ratify them would undermine international action. Officials point out, for example, that the Senate has still not given
the green light to the 1997 OAS Convention or to the 2000 Firearms Protocol,
exposing the United States to criticism and questioning of the seriousness of its
89
commitments. As a result, the U.S. administration prefers to “foster good behavior” through peer pressure and norm building rather than legally binding
agreements. However, officials admit that there is no proof that such measured
and gentle prodding has yielded meaningful results or that the persuasion and
90
leadership alone have changed the minds of willful holdouts. Also, and despite
what Washington maintains, it is equally doubtful that voluntary agreements
have prompted the timely action that might have been delayed by lengthy ratification processes. Moreover, absent minimum legally binding standards, progress might evaporate, since successive administrations in signatory nations
might not feel compelled to adhere to commitments undertaken by their
predecessors.
Norm building has been an important component in a debate that for too
long was treated as the Cinderella of arms control. After a decade of discussion,
however, it is high time to back up national and international commitments
with enforceable obligations, a declaratory intent with accountability that can
come only through the force of law.
U.S. policy to prevent and control the spread of small arms and light weapons
has changed little over the past ten years and is unlikely to evolve dramatically in
the foreseeable future. Incremental and parsimonious since its inception, the
policy has hinged upon discreet limited interventions, such as destruction of
weapons in regions of conflict, as well as capacity building and norm development. The Bush administration has showed little enthusiasm for multilateral
initiatives under the aegis of the United Nations, which has taken the lead in
confronting the problem of small arms proliferation. The sheer magnitude of
this phenomenon in Africa and elsewhere has, however, grave implications for
U.S. security, particularly when a nexus forms between arms trafficking and terrorism. Although the United States has recognized the perils of this nexus, it has
not devoted commensurate resources, focus, or expertise to tackle it. The influence of the pro-gun lobby, which has many allies in the White House and Congress, has increased over the past four years. Such influence has ensured that the
United States does not deviate from its minimalist path either at home or
abroad. Failure to renew the domestic assault-weapons ban has cast doubts on
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commitment to weapons reduction in a nation that contains half of the world’s
small arms and light weapons. Both abroad and at home, prevention is preferable to injecting more weapons in areas of instability, where belligerents (be they
government forces or nonstate actors) can perpetrate human rights abuses and
criminal networks can wreak havoc upon entire communities. This is why it is
crucial to control and keep track of arms supplies.
American leadership and example in fostering and supporting legally binding commitments aimed at keeping transfers in check, and in tracing weapons
throughout their itinerant lives, is essential but long overdue. Finally, failure of
the United States to build on the United Nations Conference has the potential to
undermine the collaboration and support of allies and partners in an array of
other fields of security cooperation.
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